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CONTROL AND COST ACCOUNTING PRACTICES IN THE
 
SPANISH ROYAL TOBACCO FACTORY
 
INTRODUCTION
 
The conventional orthology in accounting history has promoted a powerful thesis according 
to which the emergence and functioning of cost accounting practices are explained in terms 
of demand-response mode that is rooted in the notion of economic efficiency. At least two 
strands of research can be identified within that tradition. The first strand conceives 
competitive pressure as the demand that calls for the invention of new cost accounting 
procedures. Thus, Pollard (1965) found little evidence on the use of cost accounting to guide 
decision making in British firms during the industrial revolution and has surmised that this 
was due to the prevalence of high profit margins and the absence of competition (as well as, 
he contends, accounting's inexact calculations). Following in his footsteps, Edwards and 
Newell (1991) and Fleischman and Parker (1991) have suggested that intensive competition 
provides the stimulus for the use of cost calculations in order to improve firm efficiency and 
strengthen its competitive position. 
The second strand within the conventional approach formulates the demand for cost 
accounting in terms of the absence of market prices. Thus, Johnson and Kaplan (1987) have 
argued that when cost accounting first appeared, its main function was to provide 'synthetic' 
prices to facilitate the coordination of inputs into outputs in the absence of intermediate 
market transactions. As long as entrepreneurs were paying market-based piece rates for the 
output of each worker, Johnson and Kaplan argue, they had no need for cost accounting. 
While not wishing to completely deny the plausibility of the demand-response mode, we 
argue that linking the emergence of cost accounting purely to the logic of economic 
rationality will at best yield only a partial explanation of the cost accounting phenomenon 
(see also Burchell et aI, 1980). 
An alternative approach, and one that informs this paper, builds on the work of Foucault 
(1977) to link the rise and functioning of accounting to a power/knowledge framework (e.g. 
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Hoskin and Macve, 1986; Miller and O'Leary, 1987; Ezzamel, Hoskin and Macve, 1990). 
Accounting both in the 19th and 20th centuries is seen to operate as part of a disciplinary 
system that instills self-surveillance and auto-regulation by organisational subjects of their 
own activities. Much of the business history, to which cost accounting is extricably linked, 
is seen in terms of two things, first an expansion of surveillance turning "everything 
conceivable into writing: each job has clearly defined written functions, and all are located 
within a chain of command which are diagrammed in organizational charts", and second "that 
judgement is constantly exercised through written reports and directives flowing up and down 
the chain of command-reports and directives which constantly demand and process 
information which is couched in numerical form on all aspects of the enterprise" (Hoskin and 
Macve, 1986, p130). 
Once viewed as a set of discursive practices, as a regime of calculation and as a form of 
power/knowledge, interest in the emergence and functioning of cost accounting becomes 
more focused on examining the various forms in which accounting operates as a scheme of 
surveillance and how it networks with other schemes of surveillance, and its role in 
establishing new modes of accountability by virtue of its ability to render human activities 
visible thereby promoting new areas of discourse and by enabling social fields to be 
represented as areas of rational economic action (Hopwood, 1990; Roberts, 1990; 1991; 
Loft, 1993; Morgan and Willmott, 1993; Ezzamel, 1994). Pursuing such a framework of 
analysis leads to a different interpretation of changes in cost accounting practices that may 
occur contemporaneously with, or after a given time lag to, changes in the physical or 
organisational structure of the work place. Rather than purely advocating a demand-response 
argument, such accounting developments would be interpreted in terms of their discursive 
and disciplinary implications, and hence in terms of constituting a new power/knowledge 
base. 
This paper seeks to contribute to the above debate by contextuatising the design and 
implementation of cost accounting procedures in the Real Fdbrica de Tabacos de Sevilla 
(Royal Tobacco Factory, RTF) in 18th century Spain. Employing more than 1,400 workers, 
the RTF enjoyed a monopoly over snuff and cigar production, notwithstanding regular 
smuggling activities. The original documents covering the control and cost systems are 
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contained in the Archivo de Tabacalera, S.A. (Archives of the Spanish Tobacco Co). After 
a careful examination of the Archives, we located a number of documents relating to the 
Instructions issued in 1744, 1761 (which were subsequently revised in 1769), 1773 and 1779 
and these are the main sources of the data analysed here. A change in factory premises took 
place in 1758 and the paper examines the extent to which this change may be linked to 
changes in the design and use of the cost accounting system as a disciplinary regime. The 
large size of the RTF posed serious monitoring problems owing to the resulting wide span 
of control and/or the craft technology used in the factory. The paper examines the extent 
to which the quest to reduce/absorb uncertainty, caused by increased demand for tobacco, 
increased reliance on tobacco income by the Spanish Crown, change in factory premises and 
changes in production technology, was facilitated by the cost accounting system. Finally, 
the paper investigates the extent to which physical measures, reflecting the rates and mixes 
of resource utilisation, were combined with monetary measures to establish a system of 
performance evaluation and accountability, and considers the import of the findings reported 
here to the role of accounting in organisations. 
The next section contains a brief description of the Spanish tobacco industry and its 
manufacturing technology. This is followed by an examination of the control system 
employed by the RTF and a discussion of the ramifications for information and cost systems. 
The paper then deals more specifically with the cost accounting system developed in the 
RTF, and examines the methods by which the operating costs of both snuff and cigars were 
calculated. The section also reports on the extent to which the cost system was used to 
inform experiments aimed at discovering more economic production activities and in deciding 
on make or buy scenarios. The penultimate section examines the monitoring regime used 
in the RTF and explores the extent to which cost accounting was implicated in that regime. 
The final section draws together our main conclusions. 
It is crucial to acknowledge from the outset the problems that might be caused by the use of 
modern terminology to describe old systems and practices. Unfortunately, this is 
unavoidable. All that can be said is that one should be cautious in interpreting the evidence 
reported here. Despite this caveat, the paper argues that there was a strong connection 
between the cost accounting system and the control system in the RTF. One of the main 
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roles of the cost system was to buttress a set of structural measures instituted in the RTF with 
the aim of minimising the scope for tobacco theft. Another aim was to impart visibility upon 
several aspects of the work environment within the RTF that were deemed crucial for the 
improvement of factory performance. A combination of physical measures, reflecting the 
rates and mixes of resource utilisation and monetary measures were developed to facilitate 
the monitoring and surveillance of factory labour. These measures established a regime of 
calculability which rendered human accountability visible and created an environment at the 
RTF in which management could compare, differentiate, hierarchaise, homogenise, and even 
exclude individuals. 
THE SPANISH TOBACCO INDUSTRY 
The tobacco industry in Spain was initially developed in small family run workshops during 
the 16th and early 17th centuries. However, the need of the Spanish Crown to secure 
additional sources of revenue provided a powerful motivation for bringing the tobacco 
industry under state control, and in 1684 the sole right of tobacco production in Spain was 
given to the RTF by a Royal decree. Initially the RTF was located in the Fabrica de San 
Pedro (Factory of San Pedro) which produced mainly snuff and, on a small scale, cigars. 
Tobacco leaves were imported and transported to Spain by Compaiiia de la Habana (the 
Havana Company) and subsequently transferred to the RTF for manufacturing. Finished 
products (of both snuff and cigars) were entrusted to another company (Estancos) for 
distribution and selling. The popularity of tobacco consumption coupled with improved 
quality of tobacco products in the RTF brought about a sharp increase in demand. 
Rodriguez-Gordillo (1990) has documented an increase in tobacco sales volume during the 
period 1701-1740 from 1.1 to 3.9 million pounds. Also gross income sales from tobacco 
during the period 1730-1775 increased in absolute terms from 34.5 to 95.5 million Reales. 
During the same period, the proportion of total Crown income attributable to tobacco 
increased from 13 % to 28 % (Artola, 1982). Our inspection of the archives shows that this 
increased relative importance of tobacco income to the Crown was in part due to price 
increases (for example the price of a pound of snuff tobacco increased from 3 Reales per 
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pound in 1730 to 39 Reales per pound in 17801), and in part because of an increase in the 
volume of tobacco sales. Taken together, these pieces of evidence have two implications of 
relevance to this paper. Firstly, the Crown had a vested interest in maximising tobacco 
income whether through promoting demand, or increasing prices, or minimising cost of 
production. Because of its crucial contribution to state income, the RTF was considered then 
the 'jewel of the Crown'.2 Secondly, the desire to match the increase in tobacco demand 
by a corresponding increase in its production meant that the RTF was to accommodate 
significant shifts in terms of both its size and the technology of tobacco production. 
The old factory premises were located in downtown Sevilla. Prior to moving to the new 
premises the size of the old factory was increased three fold (from 3 to 9 million varas) and 
a programme of technical renovations in machinery was introduced. Similarly, horses, being 
the only source of power in the RTF, increased in number by 98.8%. These steps, however, 
were to prove insufficient to cope with the increased demand for tobacco. Furthermore, the 
old premises were vulnerable to theft as tobacco bags used to be thrown over the old factory 
walls into poorly illuminated adjacent streets. Hence, it was decided to move production to 
the Nuevas Fabricas (New Factories) which had a production capacity 21/2 times (22.5 varas) 
that of the old factory. The construction of these factories was finished in 1758 and full 
production was well under way by the 1760's. The New Factories were located outside the 
city walls in order to minimise theft, noise and smell. Three physical defences were 
established to minimise tobacco theft on the shopfloor, an internal pavement, a moat and a 
wall contained and enveloped the shopfloor. The wall itself was patrolled by armed soldiers 
and only one gate was used for entry to and exit from the factory. Hence, opportunities for 
theft, particularly during the night shifts, were reduced significantly. 
I The pattern of increase in tobacco prices during that period was not linear. Thus, the 
per pound price which was 3 Reales in 1730 increased to 15 Reales in 1731, to 32 
Reales in 1740, and then to 39 Reales in 1780. It is therefore of interest to note that 
tobacco prices remained stable, at 32 Reales per pound, over the whole period (1760­
1779) considered in this paper. 
2 When a tobacco monopoly was established in the then New Spain (present day 
Mexico) the building design and organisational arrangements of the new premises of 
the RTF were cited as the exemplar to be followed (Deans-Smith, 1986; 1990). 
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The new RTF was built as a symbol of the economic and organisational might of the 18th 
century Spanish monarchs; it was the largest civil building constructed in Spain in that 
century. Designed by military engineers, the premises exhibited some of the features of the 
military buildings of that period, in addition to having its own jail and chapel. But there was 
more than a physical similarity between the RTF and the military. Various military 
metaphors were in evidence in the RTF, the highest position was that of the superintendent, 
the position in charge of foremen was that of a lieutenant, and administrative staff were 
instructed to wear uniforms at work. 3 Also, like a military organisation, the hierarchy of 
the RTF was tightly centralised with clearly drawn vertical lines of communication and 
reporting. 
The Manufactnl"ing Process 
The new premises site housed two factories, one producing cigars and the other snuff. Even 
though cigar production was increasing gradually, snuff production was still larger; in 1760 
the weight of tobacco consumption was divided into 60% snuff and 40% cigars. However, 
by 1798 these percentages had changed to 38 % snuff and 62 % cigars (Rodriguez-Gordillo, 
1990). The manufacturing process for cigars was based on handiwork. At the operating 
level work was highly individualised with no division of labour. Each operator carried out 
the entire job of rolling the tobacco leaves to make the cigars. The factory organised 
production on the basis of work groups of ten to fifteen skilled operators who were hired on 
a weekly basis. Each week a certain amount of tobacco was transformed into a given 
number of cigars (bundles), according to pre-determined conversion rates (see Table 1). The 
salary of each worker was determined by the number of cigars produced on the basis of a 
piece rate system. Under the piece rate system higher than average production was 
worthwhile only if the target level of quality could be maintained since if quality fell below 
that the cigars had to be taken apart. Indeed, if an operator's production was lower than the 
target number of cigars, he was not allowed to deliver his output to the officers, and hence 
The "Board of Directors" of the RTF was known as "Plana Maior", a term that was 
used then to refer to Army Generals. On the differentiation of the clothing of 
personnel in administration compared to production workers the 1744 Regulations 
requested that "the doorkeepers of the Accounting office should wear decent 
clothing.... (whereas) operators of the Monte quarters should wear just a sheepskin 
jacket". 
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could not be paid a wage. Thus, to ensure receiving a wage an operator had to produce as 
a minimum the expected number of cigars of the 'standard' quality. Table 1 shows two 
characteristics that were typical of cigar production in the RTF: a) a favourable 'variance' 
(column 6) and b) the calculation of salaries on a group basis for administrative expedience, 
even though in cigar production control was exercised at the level of the individual operator. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
The snuff factory was organised differently, particularly in terms of its labour force. As far 
as the operators were concerned hiring took place on a daily basis. Contrary to the cigar 
factory, where salaries were strictly based on output, in the snuff factory workers were paid 
a fixed daily wage. In general, workers in the snuff factory were unskilled as their work 
mainly required physical strength for operating the mills and tending to the horses. The 
manufacturing process of snuff powder was carried out in six stages:4 azotea, monte, moja 
and entresuelo, repaso, fe17nenraci6n and distribucion. In the New Factories, the aZOlea was 
the terrace of the building which operated at that time as a storehouse for raw materials and 
it was there that the tobacco was.Ql:kQ. In the stage called monte the tobacco leaves were 
brought in for grinding to produce the initial snuff powder. In moja and entresuelo this 
initial snuff powder was moistened and mixed with other materials. In the repaso stage the 
product was brought in for further grinding (fine grinding) to produce a finer powder fit for 
public consumption. In !ennentaci6n the snuff was packed and finally, in distribuci6n the 
finished product was stored. This yields the following descriptive terms: (i) drying; (ii) 
grinding; (iii) moistening; (iv) fine grinding; (v) packaging; and (vi) storage. 
For costing purposes, the three intermediate stages (ii)-(iv) were classified under the generic 
noun machinery as production was concentrated at different types of mill. The rationalisation 
underlying the classification of these processes was invested with expert knowledge of factory 
space and production technology as reflected in both a physical dimension, for example the 
structure of the mills, and a technical dimension, for example quality "standards" and 
These were referred to by old Spanish names making four of them impossible to 
translate into English. 
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technological innovations relating to tobacco manufacturing. Each mill had a crew of "five 
men, a foreman, an assistant, a refiner, four horses (two for the morning shift and two for 
the night shift) and one extra horse for every two stables in case a horse should fall ill" (1761 
Regulations, 11 and 17). The technological advance of the mills was of special concern to 
the management of the RTF who, as we shall see later, looked for innovations that would 
improve quality and increase production, for example by reducing incidents of machine 
breakdown or by reducing the quantity of materials used to produce a given level of output. 5 
We will be suggesting later that the structure of the production process was rooted in the 
notions of hierarchic order and control. At the cigar factory, where manufacturing was based 
on handiwork and where it was impossible to control production effectively by means of 
direct supervision, two accounting tools of monitoring and control were used: rates for raw 
material consumption and targets for direct labour efficiency. In the case of the snuff factory 
control was exercised through the physical segmentation of the production process into 
various steps and also through the division of labour into a number of specified tasks. 
MONITORING A1\T]) CONTROL IN THE RTF 
The strength of the monopoly enjoyed by the RTF was manifest in a number of ways. One 
such indication was the levels of profits made; in 1773 total costs were 2,990,822 Reales 
and in 1775 the gross revenue was 95,538,000 Reales, that is about 32 times the level of 
costs in 1773. This implies that net profits were very high even though total costs as defined 
then did not include the cost of raw materials, allowances for depreciation of physical assets 
and the cost of distribution. Another indication of tobacco monopoly was the relatively high 
prices charged for the final products. For example, in 1780 the price of a pound of snuff 
tobacco was 39 Reales compared with a weekly average wage of just over 34 Reales for an 
operator at the snuff factory (and 60.8 Reales for an operator at the cigar factory). 
5	 In relation to the consumption of materials, even the fodder rations for the horses 
were pre-determined (Regulations from 1761,59). It was established that they should 
be fed "four measures of barley on rest days and five measures on each working day. 
The veterinarian will decide how much any sick horse should be fed". 
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In the RTF there was much concern with costs, production, and issues of product quality. 
The efficiency of the process could not be measured satisfactorily by reference to profit-based 
calculations as the RTF still only represented one link, the product conversion link, in the 
Tobacco monopoly and no internal prices were set to coordinate this activity. Because of 
this, the management of the RTF did not have information relating to the cost of materials 
they received nor to the sale prices of their finished products. In this sense, the RTF was 
simply a work station within the tobacco industry. Its efficiency could only be evaluated in 
terms of its ability to meet the growing demand for tobacco whilst securing maximum 
revenue for the Crown. As indicated earlier, strict administrative order and discipline were 
observed in the RTF through the detailed and meticulous control of materials and labour. 
It is worth noting that although the structural arrangements instituted in the New Factories 
significantly reduced the opportunities for tobacco theft (see the previous section) the 
incentive to beat the system remained strong; the high prices charged for tobacco made 
tobacco theft and illegal dealing outside the monopoly very tempting. Such temptation was 
reinforced to a large extent by the relatively low wages for the work force at the RTF and 
the poverty of most of the population of Seville at that time (Aquilar Pifial, 1989). The 
archives provide evidence which shows that workers used to conceal tobacco into their hats 
and drink bottles (which was to result later in workers being instructed to bring only crystal 
bottles whose inside could be seen and checked easily). It is also significant that the RTF 
Superintendent at the time was himself accused, but later cleared of thieving tobacco. As 
further deterrence, over and above the structural arrangements in the factory, accounting­
based controls were used in order to help further in reducing the scope for theft. Moreover, 
from 1740-1779, the period under consideration here, tobacco and snuff prices within the 
monopoly were fairly stable and hence, any desired significant increase in profits could only 
be secured either through cost reductions or increased sales volume. Rigorous control 
procedures over both raw materials and labour were used to attenuate the chances for theft 
but also to facilitate the monitoring of performance in the RTF and to increase tobacco 
profits. These procedures were communicated and their implementation pursued through 
written directives and reports that transcended the RTF chain of command. 
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Two types of control were exercised over raw materials; one dealing with quantity and the 
other with issues of quality. On the quantity side, the Labares Manager was responsible for 
supervising the production process, including the sealing of packed tobacco. As indicated 
later, the techniques of quantity control deployed were highly coercive and were managed 
and sustained through the deployment of accounting-based calculations. Control of materials 
quantity involved weighting production and quantifying rejects in terms of the amount of 
wastage. The tobacco was weighted on the factory patio after each production stage, in the 
presence of the heads of departments, the foremen and their assistants in charge of receiving 
and transferring tobacco. The internal auditor and his assistant presided over the 
proceedings. Three separate sets of accounts were then kept, one by each of the two 
foremen and one by the internal auditor, and the heads of the departments concerned had to 
sign the relevant receipts and delivery slips. The process of re-weighting was apparently so 
demanding that those performing it thought it appropriate to seek financial compensation. 
Writing on 18 January 1774 to the RTF Superintendent on behalf of himself, his two 
assistants, and the foreman of the Azaleas and his assistant, the internal auditor said: 
"The tobacco received from La Habana and Santo Domingo has been greater this 
year compared to the previous year. As a result of this, we had to do a lot of re­
weighing. At the same time we had to perform our usual tasks. We have not 
received any financial assistance. We ask you to take into account the high cost 
of living during last year when a pound of bread cost 1* Reales and we support 
very large families". 
Individuals in charge of each stage of production carried out an inventory control of the 
stock. For example: 
"The Distribution Manager will classify the tobacco by quality and weight. 
Tobacco bundles will be ordered in piles. these piles will each have a card 
showing the class of tobacco and day/month of their delivery to the warehouse". 
(Chapter 3, 3rd article; the 1761 Regulations). 
Similarly, efforts were made to minimise inventory levels: 
"Foremen of Azaleas (drying) will be told about the amount of tobacco to be 
milled in Monre (grinding). They will provide the exact amount of tobacco to 
avoid over-inventories". 
(Chapter 1, 12th article; the 1761 Regulations) 
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The emphasis here was on minimising work in progress in order to prevent theft as both 
stocks of raw materials and finished goods were stored in locked storehouses and therefore 
considered less exposed to the threat of theft. The Labores Manager was instructed to ensure 
that the exact amount of tobacco was processed at each work station. Further, in order to 
prevent theft under the guise of wastage, the Labores Manager was entrusted with issuing 
the final wastage certificate. Such detailed control of each stage, and the overall control of 
the works by the internal auditor were enshrined in an accounting procedure called "cargo 
and data" which was used in other industries of the time such as the Royal Coins (Le. the 
Mint) Factory at Valladolid. The procedure refers to two entries, one which gathers all the 
cash/goods received (cargo = sources), and another which shows the usage of the cash/goods 
received (data = application). In the case of the RTF, the registered amounts referred 
exclusively to the weight of tobacco, not to its monetary value since the cost of the raw 
materials was not known, but this was clearly deemed sufficient for the prevention of theft. 
In addition to monitoring the movement of materials, an actual count (Table 2) was 
undertaken which highlighted the differences between the physical (actual) inventory and the 
inventory to account for. Annual adjustments had to be made in those cases when the actual 
level of inventory was lower than it should have been. The actual inventory was calculated 
on an annual basis but with monthly breakdowns. Responsibility for the tobacco levels 
appears to have imposed a significant burden on the Labores Manager a relief from which, 
whenever possible, was to be welcomed. Thus, just before the reweighing of tobacco 
scheduled in February 1774, the Labores Manager wrote to the Superintendent on 25 January 
saying: 
"1 beg your support for me not to be the one responsible for the waste in raw 
materials which will occur during the next general reweighing. The RTF is over­
stocked with millions of pounds of inventory. Therefore, there will be more waste 
since the two million pounds of annual production are not enough to absorb the 
over-inventory of 13 million pounds of tobacco leaves". 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
The Labores Manager was also responsible for the goodness (quality) of the tobacco produce. 
His job was defined in the 1761 Regulations which required that "he be knowledgeable in 
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tobacco and its processes", and his responsibilities involved quality control throughout the 
production process. In the initial stage, tobacco leaves were classified into more than 200 
fine categories which were grouped into two broad categories: "exquisite" (high quality) and 
"fine" (good quality). The quality of tobacco leaves delivered to the RTF was checked 
carefully; for example, on 10 April 1774 the Superintendent of the RTF issued a document 
in which he stated: 
"Rolls (of tobacco) delivered to us will have to have a certificate indicating that 
they were completed in accordance with the weight and quality established by 
contract (with the Havana Company)". 
As far as the control of the manufacturing process was concerned, the Labores Manager 
decided how many hours were needed for each type of tobacco to be grinded and sifted and 
gave instructions to operators with respect to product quality. It was also the Laborl~s 
Manager's duty to decide upon the goodness of the finished product, and to give his seal of 
approval indicating that the tobacco was fit for use. If the final cigar's production did not 
meet the required quality, the bundles had to be untied and the cigars unrolled. 
"The quality of tobacco will be analysed in fim11lJ ntaci6n in order to check if it 
contains more additives6 than required. If this is found to be the case, the General 
Manager will be notified and the relevant foremen will be held responsible for 
reworking this tobacco". (Chapter 5, 5th article; the 1761 Regulations) 
In summary, as the tobacco market sold the products at an extremely high price, the interests 
of the monopoly called for a policy of product differentiation particularly in terms of quality 
in order to contain illegal manufacturing outside the monopoly. Product quality was 
controlled by the Labores Manager at the RTF, who had authority over the foremen. Hence, 
such control was carried out by an expert, and was basically qualitative in nature. 
This elaborate control over raw materials was buttressed by an equally strict control over the 
labour force which was also of a physical type involving checks of the labour force by 
In addition to tobacco, snuff powder contained some additives to improve both the 
smell and flavour. Sometimes, inferior quality snuff tobacco produced outside the 
RTF (on the black market) included ground soil to increase the weight. quality 
differentiation was therefore important to the RTF. 
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special inspectors at the works exit. The form of checks which had to be carried out was 
outlined by the 1761 Regulations (15-16); 
"The register will be done on a one to one basis, checking all parts of the body. 
If in the counterregister (when someone who had already been checked by a 
doorkeeper was checked again) a person is found to have tobacco, the doorkeeper 
will be punished by a four year sentence in an African prison.... if someone is 
found to have tobacco it will be made known publicly to his workmates and he 
shall be sent to prison and the superintendent shall be informed". 
Initially, only labourers were searched at the factory gate. Later, however, foremen and 
administrative staff were also searched. The 1779 Regulations which intensified physical 
checks established a picking order differentiating clearly between different levels of 
employees: 
"All members of the 'Board of Directors' (Plana Maior) will not be checked given 
the honourable positions they hold. In addition to those employees (labourers) who 
are strictly checked, the following personnel should also be checked: foremen of 
the snuff and cigar factories, the person responsible for weighing, .... Nevertheless, 
the aforementioned individuals should deserve a better treatment than simple 
operators" . 
Even workers authorised to move between different production stages/departments were 
checked as they moved from one area to another. The physical check was therefore virtually 
comprehensive, but at the same time sensitive to hierarchical position. The men who carried 
out the counterregisters were the doorkeepers' assistants, and the reward for those finding 
stolen tobacco was promotion to the jobs vacated by imprisoned doorkeepers who had failed 
to find the hidden tobacco. 
The quest for reductions in labour costs meant that the management of the RTF was 
constantly looking for means of improving the productivity per operator per day. For 
example, the Superintendent of the new mill, Joseph Lozada, issued the following instruction 
to those responsible for the Azotea (drying) process: 
"Operators from now on will treat bundles of tobacco leaves in a different way. 
Previously, operators spread the leaves on the roof very carefully. The main time­
consuming task was the opening of the sacks and then the filling of these sacks 
after the leaves had dried. Joseph Lozada and his advisors found a way for 
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opening the sacks through the careful rubbing of the sack on a carved stone. This 
resulted in an increase in production from 6 sacks per operator per day to 19 sacks 
per operator per day". 
Similar developments occurred in other production processes. For example, in the Monte 
(grinding) process improvements in labour efficiency made it possible for the output per 
operator per day to increase from 38 kilos to 68 kilos. Such significant improvement in 
labour productivity rendered the night shift redundant, a welcomed outcome because night 
shifts were associated with lower productivity, lower quality, and increased fire hazard since 
the factory was illuminated by oil lamps, but perhaps even more importantly they were more 
prone to theft. 
THE COST ACCOUNTING SYSTEM 
The cost accounting system develoPed in the RTF was instituted by the 1773 Regulations and 
was related to the routine tasks involved in tobacco production. The main technical focus 
of the system was on determining production cost, both in terms of actual procurement and 
cost levels permitted (expected) for specitic levels of output. This section examines these 
costing procedures in relation to the production of both snuff and cigars. Further, the section 
provides some evidence on the extent to which decision making in the RTF, e.g. make or 
buy, was informed by cost calculations. First, however, it is worth noting that the 
accounting function in the RTF was headed by the Chief Accountant who had two internal 
auditors below him; one dealing with the snuff factory and the other with the cigar factory. 
Each internal auditor submitted accounting reports to the Chief Accountant and these were 
then compared against the accounts independently prepared by each of the heads of the 
production departments. Any variations between the two sets of accounts were investigated 
by the Chief Accountant. Responsibility for the accounts kept in each production department 
was traced directly to the relevant department head and each head had to sign his 
departmental accounts. 
Op~l'ating Costs 
The cost accounting system was described in the 1773 Regulations entitled: "General 
information on the instruments that are necessary to form the plan which calculates the cost 
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of each pound of snuff and cigars produced in a whole year". The Regulations did not 
indicate what the objectives of cost calculations and reporting were; they simply stipulated 
how the cost of a pound of the finished product should be calculated. However, given the 
monitoring and costing procedures described earlier, a number of pertinent observations can 
be made concerning emphasis on achieving improvements in factory performance. For 
example, the 1769 amendment of the 1761 Instructions stated that: 
".... the number of cigar workers is presently over 320. This number should be 
reduced to 240 in the future....Cigar workers will receive 6,000 pounds of tobacco 
leaves less every month in order to reduce the high inventory levels in the 
warehouses" . 
Further, while the administrators of the Tobacco Industry considered the physical procedures 
for the control of materials and workers in the RTF suitable for improving the conduct of 
the workers and reducing theft, they thought they were not sufficient either to enhance 
significantly the efficiency of the production process in terms of ensuring cost reductions and 
quality improvements or to prevent theft altogether. This was particularly so in the case of 
cigar production. In contrast to the routine activities involved in snuff production which can 
be monitored through the use of physical measures, the activities relating to cigar production 
were highly non-routine. Direct supervision of cigar production was deemed incomplete for 
monitoring purposes; to ensure that cigars produced were of high quality, targets for raw 
materials and labour were used. Moving tobacco production to the New Factories also posed 
additional control problems. The control procedures had to cope with a much larger factory 
space than previously. Moreover, there was more pressure to improve the use of that space 
as initial comparisons with the old factory revealed that the usage of space in the New 
Factories was inferior. For example, sales volume per one square varas declined from over 
400 pounds in the old factory to about 140 pounds in the new factory. This lead 
subsequently to a new cost statistic being calculated, namely the cost of each unit produced. 
With the guidance of the 1773 Regulations, the RTF calculated its costs annually, employing 
data from financial accounting records. 7 The cost accounting system and the financial 
In its report to the Renta de Tabaco (Tobacco Income Tax Department) the RTF 
considered financial accounting a suitable system for reporting (see Gutierrez, 1993). 
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accounting system, the latter being in operation before the first, were strongly connected; 
for example, entries for salaries, sundry materials, etc were identical in both sets of accounts. 
However, it is important to note that in some cases different procedures were developed for 
both systems; for example, some entries relating to cash outflows were not produced for 
cost accounting purposes, as in the case of structural repairs of administrative offices. Cost 
calculations were performed separately for each of the snuff and cigar factories as each was 
involved in a single distinct activity. 
l1ze Production Cost of Snuff: The cost of producing snuff was classified across eight cost 
centres called Casillas. With regard to personnel cost, the characteristics of the casillas 
mirrored the distinction in the organisation structure between manufacturing and non­
manufacturing departments. Direct labour and supervision costs were calculated for each of 
the three large production stages, azorea, moja and enrresue!o and machinery. In contrast, 
three other cost centres were created for each of the service departments: administration, 
maintenance and stables. Hence, this cost was akin to some figure of value added being 
assigned to the cost of each pound of tobacco. In addition, two casillas attracted the cost of 
indirect materials. 
The final cost of production figure did not include either the cost of raw materials (tobacco) 
or fixed asset depreciation, but then there is no evidence to suggest that costing system 
elsewhere in Spain at that time accounted for depreciation in physical assets. The main 
reason for excluding the cost of raw materials from production cost appears to be the ability 
of the management of the RTF to monitor the movement of raw materials and levels of 
inventory by weight and wastage statistics respectively. There were also additional reasons 
that rendered the calculation of the cost of raw materials either difficult or unnecessary. Raw 
materials were usually obtained from widely differing sources of supply covering differing 
destinations, and because of logistic problems the tobacco journey from the sources of supply 
to the RTF took a very long time. These factors combined made difficult the calculation of 
the cost of each incoming bundle of tobacco. When tobacco was purchased from owners of 
private land it was possible to calculate the cost of purchase. However, in many cases 
tobacco was collected by the Crown in the form of tax in kind with no financial calculations 
being made (i.e. tax was levied as a percentage of the volume of the crop). Finally, the 
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organisation of the tobacco industry meant that responsibility for the cost of tobacco was left 
in the hands of the Havana Company; hence the RTF had little incentive to trace out and 
accumulate the cost of raw materials. 
The Production Cost of Cigars: Costs were traced to four casillas in the cigar factory. 
Casilla 1 contained the administration costs of the cigar factory; although the 1773 
Regulations stipulated that the general administration cost of the whole RTF be allocated to 
the snuff factory, allocations of these costs were made to QQ1h factories. Similarly, the 
personnel cost of the ten doorkeepers employed in the RTF was allocated by assigning the 
cost of four doorkeepers to the cigar factory and the remaining six to the snuff factory in 
consistency with the sales proportions of both products at that time. Casilla 2 attracted the 
cost of the front line factory supervisors and casilla 3 attracted labour cost (which was based 
on fixed amounts per bundle at a strict piece rate). Finally, casilla 4 attracted the cost of 
indirect materials. 
The simplification of the cigar production process, mainly due to the use of craft technology 
and the lack of fine classification of labour, was consistent with the simple procedures used 
to calculate cigar manufacturing costs. This simplicity was facilitated further by the strict 
piece rate salary system which was used to monitor the highly significant cost of direct 
labour (approximately 90% of total cost). As in the case of the snuff factory, the cost of a 
pound of cigars reflected a figure of value added which was calculated for each bundle of 
cigars, as neither the cost of raw materials nor the depreciation of machinery and installations 
was included. 
Production Experiments to Improve Efficiency 
The quest for attaining improvements in production through the use of cost calculations, 
targets for production volume and permitted/expected costs etc, was a main feature of the 
RTF control system. This appears to have been associated with the wave of rationalism 
which prevailed during the second half of 18th century Spain (e.g. Carmona and Gutierrez, 
1994). Efforts to improve production and performance were always sought and when 
successful those involved were rewarded generously. For example, in 1730 a new design 
for the mills permitted some significant savings, which were calculated in the archives as: 
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"(For) every day and night 144 horses plus their food and horseshoes, 13 
housekeepers who look after them, 72 operators who had to work in the 36 mills". 
What was also significant was that the man who invented the successful design of the mills 
received, as a reward from the King, a lifelong pension of 1,000 Escudos per year. 
Similarly, a system of appraisal focusing on investment in technological innovation was 
developed in the RTF, particularly in the case of the new mills (Rodriguez-Gordillo, 1975).8 
The benefits which seem to have emerged from this included improvements in the quality of 
snuff and a simplification of the production process, as well as the development of new 
measures such as the number of workers and horses per mill, repairs and animal fodder. 
With such information, the cost of operations in the two mills was measured. Given that the 
cost structure was similar in both cases, decisions were driven by the profitability of the 
installation. 
To provide further concrete evidence on the emphasis placed by the management of the RTF 
upon improving manufacturing operations and reducing the cost of production, we examine 
a production experiment which took place in 1778. The experiment was designed by 
Francisco Portocarrero who was appointed General Inspector of the RTF by a Royal Decree 
dated 16 July 1777 with a specific remit to develop this experiment. By virtue of his new 
position, Portocarrero had full authority over the manufacturing process. The annual output 
capacity of the RTF when Portocarrero took his new post was six million pounds of tobacco, 
and the stated aim of the experiment was to explore the possibility of extending output 
beyond that level as indicated by the title with which the experiment was inaugurated: 
"Experiment to be carried out to investigate the possibility of producing more than 
six million pounds of tobacco per year". 
The experiment lasted for 30 working days (21 April - 25 May). It concentrated on four out 
of the six stages of production: mome, moja and emresuelo, repaso andfennemaci6n. The 
terms of reference for those running the experiment were encapsulated in one single 
It is worth noting that the profitability analysis used to inform such investment 
appraisal decisions was already developed by 1731 (more than 40 years before the 
Cost Regulations of 1773 were adopted). 
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instruction: "to investigate whether or not production could be increased without diminishing 
quality". The team involved in the experiment included supervisors and foremen from each 
of the above four production stages, quantity and quality inspectors, and the acting 
accountant Manuel Vallarin. 
The division of labour among members of the experiment team demonstrates Portocarrero's 
good awareness of some of the basic fundamentals of organising. Thus, the foremen were 
responsible for reporting on breakdowns in production, the times spent on each stage and 
whether or not those exceeded permitted times, the quality of products, and any savings in 
the cost of processing tobacco leaves into raw materials. The supervisors were to report on 
the volume of tobacco processed in each production stage, the resources used in production, 
and the quantity of tobacco that could have been processed, and the difference between actual 
and possible output volumes. The inspectors were responsible for exercising daily control 
over incoming materials in the 1170nre and 1170ja and enrresuelo stages and over the tobacco 
processed in each of the production stages, and also for monitoring the quality of processed 
tobacco. Vallarin, the acting accountant, kept records of the experiments. Information 
collected by members of the team was submitted to Portocarrero on a regular basis. Figure 
1 shows a report on the experiment prepared by the accountant Vallarin and submitted by the 
General Inspector Portocarrero to the Superintendent of the RTF in order for him to bring 
the outcome of the experiment to the attention of the King. 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
As the Figure shows, 638,717 pounds of tobacco were produced during the 30 day period 
which over a period of 292 working days per year translate into an annual production target 
of 6,216,845 pounds, well over the presumed annual factory capacity. The experiment also 
rendered the enrresuelo stage unnecessary thereby resulting in its elimination in subsequent 
production. Significant cost savings were also made possible; the cost of production was 
reduced from 6 million Reales before the experiment to below 2 million Reales. Further, 
Portocarrero was able to discover a new way of processing waste initially valued at a little 
over 2 million Reales under the old production procedures into new products worth nearly 
68 million Reales. Finally, as a consequence of the experiment a new Regulations was 
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issued in 1779 requesting that cost calculations in the RTF be made on a monthly basis and, 
more importantly, endorsing the new production procedures developed in the experiment. 
Table 3 shows the volume of snuff produced during the period 1770-1775, the expenditure 
incurred and the annual cost of a pound of tobacco. The costing procedures did not simply 
involve the reporting of cost information to the administrators of the tobacco industry. Costs 
were calculated retrospectively in order to evaluate performance and to promote self 
discipline. In Table 3, the volume of production and the cost of production were entered for 
each of the years 1770-1775 and then aggregated. The aggregate volume and cost were then 
used to derive the expected cost of 6 million pounds of tobacco output. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Experiments to Decide Whether to Make or Buy 
A number of experiments, some of apparently insignificant direct financial consequences, 
were undertaken with the purpose of reducing production costs. For example, on 7 
November 1775 the Superintendent issued a decree which reported on an experiment to check 
the cost of making versus buying sealing wax for tobacco tins. The cost of making 3 QI'rohos 
and 10 pounds was calculated at 62 Reales. The decree stated that: 
".... fore more than forty years we have been paying more than 900 Reales for 
such an amount. It (making internally) means making a substantial saving in such 
a small scale operation. Therefore, purchase of sealing wax should stop". 
Similarly, the same document stated that consumption of ink over and above 400 Reales was 
not needed, thereby making a saving of 860 Reales per year. 
The most financially significant make or buy experiment however related to tobacco tins. 
Tins with six different sizes were used for packing tobacco; six, four, two, one, one half 
and one quarter pound. The tins had always been bought from an external supplier. In 1778 
an experiment was undertaken to produce tins for the first six months of that Year. The 
purpose of the experiment was to determine the cost of producing tins internally as well as 
the ability of internal supply to match the external demand for tins. 
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The experiment produced three calculations for the volume of tins produced during the period 
January-June 1778: (i) the total cost of producing the tins internally; (ii) the price of buying 
the tins from external suppliers; and (iii) the savings that would be achieved if the tins were 
made internally instead of being bought externally. Initial calculations show an overall 
saving for making over buying by an amount of 163,191 Reales, but the final figure was 
reduced when additional indirect costs related to tin making, such as the salary of the Trustee 
in charge of tin making, were taken into account. The success of the experiment in 
demonstrating that tin making was cheaper than buying from external sources resulted in the 
management of the RTF deciding to make tins internally. Not only were accounting 
calculations instrumental in informing what could be described in modern textbooks as a 
standard make/buy decision, but equally importantly, once the decision was taken to make 
tins internally, the cost accounting system was used to monitor tin production in the RTF. 
The cost per type of tin arrived at from the experiment was used as the yardstick against 
which the costs of successive production runs of tins were compared. The outcome of the 
experiment in terms of cost per unit was therefore normalised. The Trustee in charge of tin 
production had to submit reports comparing actual production costs against targets, that is, 
cost levels considered normal (segul1 las relactiones). Whenever actual costs of tin 
production exceeded the norm, the reasons for deviations had to be reported by the Trustee 
directly to the Superintendent of the RTF. 
It is evident from the preceding discussion that the cost accounting system in the RTF not 
only evolved various procedures for the purpose of accumulating, classifying and reporting 
the cost of tobacco production, but it also informed the various experiments undertaken in 
the RTF to determine norms of performance with the aim of improving the utilisation of 
factory facilities and the minimisation of production cost. The procedures dealing with 
accounting for the cost of production reflected and reinforced the production technology used 
in the factory (Braverman, 1974). Thus, separate accounts were kept for both snuff and 
cigars. The production costs for snuff and cigars were traced to a number of costs centres 
(Casillas) that mirrored the physical production arrangements for each of the two products 
within the factory. Moreover, as we have seen, accumulated costs were classified into a 
number of categories, e.g. manufacturing and non-manufacturing; sundry materials and 
horse fodder, etc which facilitated more detailed cost analyses. The evolving costing 
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procedures were sufficiently flexible to accommodate variations in the wage systems used 
(piece rate for cigars and fixed wages for snuff) and to effect some allocation of common 
overheads between cigar and snuff production. 
The detailed costing procedures used in the RTF yielded a wealth of information which made 
possible: (i) the calculation of the cost per unit of final product of a specific grade (quality); 
(ii) the tracing of cost categories to individual cost centres; and (iii) the accumulation of the 
total cost of specific cost categories, e.g. labour cost, across cost centres for the whole 
factory. Detailed cost information, both in physical and monetary terms, was therefore 
available and ready to be deployed for the purposes of surveillance and improving employee 
discipline through cost determination, performance monitoring and theft avoidance. 
The significance of the two experiments discussed above (production and make/buy) and their 
attendant accounting implications should not be understated. While direct evidence on the 
use of cost information for the purposes of performance monitoring in the RTF is sparse in 
the archives, the two experiments were clearly intended to uncover more economic means 
of tobacco production and packaging. Further, the intentions were subsequently translated 
into 'concrete' production targets with significant cost savings. To recapitulate, the 
production experiment resulted in the elimination of one of the production stages, a higher 
production target was established as the norm for future production activities, a more 
efficient method for processing waste, and the reporting of costing figures over shorter 
intervals. The make/buy experiment had the decisive effect of internalising the supply of tins 
in preference to securing them from the more costly external suppliers. Moreover, the 
production of tins in the RTF was subjected to the rationalisation and monitoring effects of 
accounting. Possible savings or cost over-runs became quantifiable and were brought to the 
attention of management through regular accounting reports. We argue that such focus on 
accounting-based calculations had strong disciplinary implications in the RTF, and in the next 
section we examine some of these implications. 
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COST ACCOUNTING AS A DISCIPLINARY REGIME IN THE RTF 
As we argue later, the cost accounting system used in the RTF was neither the only nor the 
first of its kinds to be used in 18th century Spain. Our interest in the case of the RTF is due 
to our desire to analyse cost accounting as a form of power/knowledge with disciplinary 
implications for those who were involved in designing the system, those who used it to 
monitor the performance of others, and finally, those lowest ranks in the RTF hierarchy 
whose performance was subjected to the meticulous calculation of accounting. The argument 
we advance in this section is that the effects of cost accounting go much further than the 
constituency of organisational employees who have come to be referred to in conventional 
academic writing as those who are the intended subjects of control. Viewing control in the 
context of a configuration of power relations, it is imperative to admit to the analysis the 
disciplinary effects of accounting upon all levels of management. 
Cost Accollntin2 and the Emer2ence of the Tobacco Re2111ations 
The tobacco regulations were issued by the 'Director General de la Renta del Tabaco', or 
the Tobacco Agency. It appears that the RTF itself was not directly involved in lobbying 
the Tobacco Agency, or indeed the Crown, to bring about the formulation and promulgation 
of any of these regulations. The main motivation for these regulations was to secure the flow 
of the maximum amount of tobacco income to the Crown. Crucially, however, the cost 
accounting-based regulations for the tobacco industry were rooted in the technical know-how 
of accounting expertise within the RTF. These regulations were identical to the procedures 
of the cost accounting system of the RTF designed by a man called Vallarin. 
"It (The Regulations) is a copy of the original and novel work of Mr Manuel 
Vallarin who designed a system of cost calculation, the cost of a pound of snuff 
and cigars produced in the factories". (The 1773 Regulations). 
It is not clear from the Archives which parts of the cost accounting system that Vallarin 
designed were the direct outcome of his own inspiration and which parts were adaptations 
of costing systems used in the factories of the time. Given the many similarities exhibited 
by these and earlier systems (see below), it is very likely that Vallarin owes some debt to 
their designers. More crucially, the Archives do not reveal which precise discontinuity 
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compelled Vallarin to design the cost accounting system. Any of a number of contesting 
claims for the motivation of the design of system, including clearly the demand-response and 
the power/knowledge framework. Evidently, being a monopoly, the economic context in 
which the tobacco industry operated did not exhibit the competitive pressure identified by 
some scholars (e.g. Pollard, 1965; Fleischman and Parker, 1991) as providing the 
antecedent condition for cost accounting to emerge. However, it could be argued that cost 
accounting emerged to provide 'synthetic' prices for labour, Le. piece rates, along the lines 
suggested by Johnson and Kaplan (1987) except that such an argument does not explain why 
the cost system emerged only in 1773, nearly ninety years after the establishment of the 
RTF. 
Rather than advocate a demand-response thesis we prefer to explain the cost accounting 
practices in the RTF via the power/knowledge framework. Although it is difficult to 
privilege this approach over others when considering the emergence of the cost accounting 
system, given the lack of direct evidence in the archives, the disciplinary link is much easier 
to establish with respect to the functioning of the system. Once the cost accounting system 
was invented, a new base of power/knowledge in the tobacco industry was established with 
ramifications extending beyond the factory. Thus, as soon as the system was developed by 
Vallarin, the Tobacco Agency formalised its use in the RTF, through the writing of new 
regulations, thereby providing a means of surveillance, discipline and monitoring of top 
management at a distance of the RTF. Similarly, written reports produced by the cost 
accounting system were brought to the attention of the King, as in the case of the production 
experiment, providing yet another chain of accountability and discipline for the 
Superintendent and his senior colleagues. Within the RTF itself, we argue in more detail 
below that the cost accounting system provided an invisible technology of surveillance and 
discipline which worked alongside the more visible technologies of surveillance such as 
physical search. 
It is plausible to suggest that although the power to initiate and promulgate tobacco 
regulations resided in the hands of the Tobacco Agency, the RTF participated in checking 
the calculations which underlined the emergence of such regulations. The impact of the 
accounting power/knowledge in constituting disciplinary regulations was therefore evident 
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even at that stage. The Tobacco Agency had to rely on experts invested with technical 
accounting knowledge, such as Vallarin, to define and generate accounting calculations which 
were then used in formulating the tobacco costing regulations. These included detailed 
calculations of the costs of different kinds of materials, allowances of food quantities for 
horses, cost of human labour, etc. 
From a disciplinary perspective, three important arguments emerge from the RTF case. 
Firstly, the state, through its bureaucratic organs, had a strong motivation to bring the 
tobacco industry under its disciplinary gaze; this was triggered by the desire to maximise 
tobacco income for the Crown. There may have been other motives, for example, protecting 
ailing and poorly managed crucial industries as exemplified by the takeover of the textile 
factory at Ezcaray, which is discussed further below. Secondly, the constitutive role of 
accounting as a power/knowledge regime in defining the nature and extent of state 
regulations, but at the same time the role played by state regulations in rendering more 
visible and powerful the effects of accounting calculations, point to a mutual dependency 
relationship between accounting and the state (Miller, 1990; Ezzamel, 1993a; 1993b). 
Thirdly, the participation by the management of the RTF, through its access to specialised 
knowledge of the micro-technology of accounting, in determining the calculations which 
informed the tobacco regulations points to management's awareness of the significance of 
accounting as a calculative regime. 
Before moving on to examine the disciplinary role of the cost accounting system in the RTF 
it is of interest to reflect on the career of the man who pioneered the system, Manuel 
Vallarin. In 1773, Vallarin was an Assistant Accountant with a salary of 833 Reales per 
month. In 1774, Clement de Castro, the Chief Accountant and Vallarin's superior, was 
appointed Acting Superintendent of the RTF. The post of Chief Accountant was among the 
most senior and prestigious occupations in the RTF, for example, the Chief Accountant 
deputised for the Superintendent of the RTF when the latter was absent. Because the 
tradition of the RTF at that time was for the post of Chief Accountant to be restricted to 
members of the Knighthood and because Vallarin did not belong to the upper crust of Spanish 
society, he was initially appointed in 1774 as Acting Chief Accountant but with the same 
salary of 833 Reales per month that he was paid previously instead of the salary of 1,583 
- 25 -
Reales paid to his predecessor. In 1776, in his new capacity as Acting Chief Accountant, 
Vallarin applied the 1773 costing procedures backwards to the period 1770-1775 to perform 
post-hoc cost calculations. These calculations were instrumental in establishing the average 
cost of the production used in the experiment initiated by Portocarrero in 1778. Vallarin, 
it should be noted, was one of the principal actors involved in the production experiment. 
His technical accounting expertise was brought to bear on the successful running of the 
experiment. 
In 1780, after the production experiment was deemed successful, Vallarin was appointed 
Chief Accountant with a salary of 2,000 Reales, more than twice his previous salary and 417 
Reales higher than the salary of his predecessor. To appreciate the extent of Vallarin's 
financial reward, it is relevant to compare his salary history to that of the General Inspector 
Portocarrero. In 1778, when the production experiment was conducted, Portocarrero's salary 
was 4,166 Reales per month, more than two and a half times the salary of the Chief 
Accountant at that point in time. In 1779, while Vallarin was Acting Chief Accountant at 
a salary of 833 Reales, Portocarrero's salary was reduced to 2,500 Reales. Once 
Portocarrero left his post later on in 1779, the salary of General Inspector was reduced 
further to 1,666 Reales, exactly twice as much as Vallarin's salary in that year. In 1780, the 
year when Vallarin was appointed Chief Accountant, the salary of General Inspector was 
down to a mere 833 Reales, well under half Vallarin's salary. 
The dynamics of the salary scenarios described above raise several interesting questions: 
Given the success of the production experiment, why was the salary of the General Inspector 
reduced so significantly (ultimately, to only 20% of its level in 1778)? What precise reasons 
lead to the elevation of the salary of Chief Accountant in 1780? Was that because of a 
perceived increased importance of the post of Chief Accountant? Or was the increase in 
salary more of a reflection of the capability of Vallarin? These, and similar questions are 
intriguing but the lack of evidence in the archives renders it impossible to address the 
questions in a meaningful manner. Yet it is clear that Vallarin was handsomely rewarded 
both financially and in terms of career progression. Further, it is worth recalling that 
Vallarin's contribution to the design and further development of the cost accounting system 
culminated in the breakdown of a tradition according to which only Knights were appointed 
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Chief Accountants. If there was ever an accounting hero in the case of the RTF, then 
Vallarin must be the one. Quite simply, Vallarin's personal fortunes, and those of the post 
of Chief Accountant, rose with the emergence and rise of cost accounting within the RTF. 
The Disciplinary Role of Accountine in the RTF 
A number of researchers have been concerned to demonstrate how accounting can operate 
as a potent disciplinary regime in organisations (Hoskin and Macve, 1986; Miller and 
D'Leary, 1987; Ezzamel, 1994). Because of its ability to quantify human performance, 
accounting renders such performance visible, and the visibility encourages new areas of 
discourse as alternative courses of action are subjected to the accounting logic of calculation 
and integrated in its formal reports. Disciplinary regimes such as accounting impose 
compulsory visibility on those subjected to its calculation and, as Foucault (1977) has argued, 
it is through this visibility that their subjection is secured and sustained. In the remainder 
of this section we comment of the extent to which the cost accounting system in the RTF 
developed as a micro-technology of surveillance and discipline. 
The details of the archives discussed above give some indication of the extent to which the 
cost accounting system as an invisible technology can network with other visible disciplinary 
regimes. The RTF operated with two schemes of surveillance; one architecture-based and 
the other system-based, both contributing to the creation of visibility of factory activities. 
The architecture of the new premises of the RTF created visibility in space (Foucault, 1977; 
see also Loft, 1993), as factory activities were now reordered and deliberately placed in 
locations that rendered surveillance much easier than in the old factory. The physical flow 
of production across different production stages became more visible. Such visibility became 
even more focused by means of the physical separation of the employees' inner world (the 
factory) from the outer world (outside the factory) established through visible architectural 
devices such as the internal pavement, the moat and the wall that enveloped the shopfloor. 
The very concept of the panopticon pioneered by Bentham (1843) and articulated by Foucault 
(1977) was clearly in operation in the RTF, and the panopticon thereby instituted ensured that 
production space was constantly under its own disciplinary gaze. 
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System surveillance was enshrined in the procedures of the control system in general and the 
cost accounting system in particular. The procedures established by the control system to 
monitor quantity (e.g. physical checks; matching of the actual versus the expected) and 
quality (meeting pre-specified targets) created a framework within which performance can 
be assessed and reported. Moreover, these procedures established a well specified ranking 
order that differentiated individuals according to rank and status (for example, the varying 
intensity of physical checks). And the carrot-and-stick method was also used to endow 
system surveillance with meaning and purpose. 
But it is on that part of system surveillance relating to cost accounting that we intend to 
focus. The role of accounting as a system of surveillance has long been noted, for example 
Bentham (1843) treated bookkeeping (in its more general sense thereby incorporating the 
keeping of financial and non-financial books) as one of the main pillars of his system of 
surveillance. For Bentham, good book-keeping was the manifestation of good management. 
As Loft (1993, p234), paraphrasing Bentham, has noted "the book-keeping, or rather, 
recording enables this visibility to extend through time, in the books, events remain 'visible' 
and can form the basis for power to act at a later point in time". Similarly, as Braverman 
(1974) has noted, architecture and system procedures can mirror, and reproduce, each other; 
production processes are replicated in paper form before, while and after they materialise in 
physical form. 
It can be seen that the cost accounting system in the RTF displayed the disciplinary attributes 
identified above. The design of the new premises, having mirrored the architectural plans 
in paper form, was replicated in the cost accounting system. By attracting costs to specific 
casillas the factory was reproduced in paper not as a set of architectural drawings but, more 
crucially, as centres of cost calculation. A new visibility was therefore created through 
which the factory became a financial identity. Once written, these financial translations of 
the factory became records that extended through time and space. For now, as we shall 
discuss in more detail below, express comparisons between actual achievements and targets 
can be drawn. Further, these accounts can be visited, and acted upon, many years later. 
For example, Vallarin's post-hoc analysis in 1776 of production costs for the period 1770-
1775 established the costing frame of reference for the production experiment, and the prices 
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paid for sealing wax were traced back forty years earlier. Accounts are never 'dead' nor 
become a mere irrelevance just because they have been 'closed' for the period. Visibility 
created by accounting therefore transcends time. It also transcends space, for as a written 
form accounts become mobile (Latour, 1990; Robson , 1992) and therefore could be 
transported between different production locations and from the administrative offices to the 
factory and back again (Loft, 1993) therefore making their consultation at different locations 
possible. Such mobility makes certain factory locations visible in other locations either in 
the factory or in the administrative offices. 
In the context of the RTF, the micro-technology of accounting combined, as we have seen, 
both physical and monetary measures. These measures were available as techniques of 
surveillance, and were operated in layers either simultaneously or sequentially. In the case 
of the physical measures, these reflected both quality and quantity particularly when 
monitoring raw materials and human labour. Each of these measures imposed a different 
kind of discipline. Quantity (weights) measures discipline the rate of utilisation by seeking 
to minimise spillages, breakages and 'unnecessary' loss of materials during transportation 
within the factory and during the manufacturing process itself. In contrast, quality measures 
discipline the mix of utilisation and the human skill with which inputs are transformed into 
outputs of predetermined attributes. The segmentation of each of the snuff and cigar 
factories into casillas (cost centres) that mirrored the physical flow of production and services 
created centres of calculation that rendered the various activities in the factories highly 
visible. Hence, in decomposing the organisation down into constituent parts, accounting 
rendered the activities in the factory visible (see also Roberts, 1990). The production 
technologies with their full diversity were captured by a set of accounting numbers that had 
the aura of being objective and concrete. Interdependences between successive stages of 
production were internalised in the accounting system as the flow of production volumes was 
quantified, both physically and in monetary terms, and documented in the accounts. The 
ritual of weighing production deliveries from one stage to another in a 'public' open space 
such as the factory patio and in the presence of representatives from each stage and the 
internal auditor are all manifestations of the micro-technology of accounting at work. 
Visibility of performance was not restricted only to entries in the accounts and reports but 
assumed a 'physical' presence in an open space for all to see. The presence of the internal 
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auditor during the weighing process as the neutral, dispassionate arbitrator invested with 
technical knowledge endows the whole process with legitimacy and authority. Deviations 
from expectations or established practices could therefore be deemed wasteful, undesirable 
and abnormal. By rendering spillages, breakages, loss and inferior quality abnormal, high 
rates of utilisation and superior mixes and skills become normalised, and, more importantly, 
with this comes the very normalisation of disciplinary practices in the work place. Through 
repeated physical checks of labourers at the RTF, by imposing heavy sanctions not only upon 
those who appropriate tobacco but also upon the doorkeepers who fail to detect 
infringements, and by promising lucrative rewards to those who uncover stolen goods, the 
disciplinary gaze of the micro-technology of accounting is made to transcend the whole 
workforce. 
New areas of discourse were also encouraged by the ability of the accounting system in the 
RTF to quantify and render human performance visible as exemplified by the two 
experiments conducted in the factories. The production experiment exposed various 
inefficiencies in previous production arrangements and gave legitimacy to a new production 
scenario that resulted in the creation of higher performance targets. The post hoc cost 
analysis over the period 1770-1775 conducted by Vallarin established average costs of 
production that became the frame of reference for that experiment. Experimentations with 
new production levels were therefore mediated by such cost targets. Similarly, the make/buy 
experiments gave rise to the more economically efficient alternatives of making products 
internally in preference to buying from external suppliers. By encouraging such new areas 
of discourse in which new alternative scenarios were quantified and contrasted against 'old' 
ways of doing things, accounting helped to promote new work disciplines that had the aura 
of greater economic efficiency. 
The quest for normalisation of disciplinary practices in the RTF was enhanced further by the 
development of financial measures of performance involving both expected and actual 
calculations. Not only did such measures trace the minute details relating to each cost 
element and production process, but they also brought the performance of those operating 
in different parts of the factory into direct and apparently meaningful comparisons by virtue 
of monetary values operating as a common denominator. Thus, in addition to emphasising 
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the discipline of improving the rates and mixes of utilisation of resources, we now have 
another form of discipline which instills cost consciousness. Deviations from normalised cost 
targets that result in cost over-runs can be readily seen to be reducing the profit flow from 
the tobacco industry to the Spanish Crown. Also, improved production targets could now 
be pursued more rigorously. This was reinforced further through the application of a strict 
piece rate salary in the cigar factory; the quantity measure (the piece) is now combined with 
the financial measure (the rate) to yield a new statistic (the salary) that provides a simple, 
yet powerful, representation with a double meaning. For the tobacco worker, it is a direct 
compensation for his effort, normalised across time and space in a linear fashion. The 
consequences of discipline are made both visible and direct; only by increasing the number 
of pieces produced of the right (normalised) quality can the worker earn more money. The 
merits of subscribing to the factory discipline, of being docile and obedient are now 
transparent. The implications for the RTF are also important; as part of the cost of 
production, wages now could be seen to reflect productivity in a most obvious manner. Any 
increase in the cost of production may be tolerated only if it is accompanied by a 
corresponding increase in tobacco output. 
While developing the case for accounting's ability to render some dimensions of activities 
and human performance visible, it is imperative to appreciate its capacity to make other 
dimensions invisible. As Morgan and Willmott (1993, pp9-1O) have noted recently, the 
visibility/invisibility dichotomy 
"suggests that accounting practices are selectives in whar they render visible. 
Some things are endowed with an existence and are given attention; others go 
unrecognised and unrecorded. The entry of accounting practices into new areas 
involves a redefinition of what is important in particular contexts, contexts in 
which the relevance and effects of accounting discourses and practices are 
selectively interpreted and enacted" (original emphasis). 
As a non-neutral technology susceptible to political manipulation accounting therefore plays 
a major role in constituting the domains of the visible and invisible. But the boundary 
between these two domains is not purely determined by the political sensitivity of accounting 
to specific interest groups in the organisation; to a large extent it is also mediated by the 
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technical state of accounting as a body of knowledge in terms of what it is capable/incapable 
of doing. 
The preceding analysis reinforces the emphasis that Foucault (1977; 1980) has placed on the 
importance of detailed, apparently mundane, organisational practices as means of discipline 
and surveillance. In the context of accounting these practices form a micro-technology of 
power which seeks to neutralise and master any potential counter power so that resistance 
is subverted or minimised. This means that the disciplinary power of accounting, just like 
any other disciplinary power, develops strategies to prevent or overcome what Foucault calls 
'anything that may establish horizontal conjunctions', such as 'agitations, revolts, 
spontaneous organisations, coalitions' and the like. By representing aspects of human 
performance through its powerful metric, either quantatively through measures such as rate 
of utilisation and mix of utilisation, or financially through measures such as piece rate, 
accounting provides a means through which those working in the organisation can be 
compared, differentiated, hierarchaised, and homogenised. 9 For example, with measures 
reflecting rate of utilisation of raw materials and labour, the management of the RTF could 
draw express comparisons of the productivity of every worker and of every production 
process. Using those, and similar measures, the management could also engage in a 
differentiation exercise of its work force at two levels. Firstly, workers could be 
differentiated by function and process, as evidenced by the development of separate targets 
of performance for each of the tobacco production process and also for the production of 
snuff as distinct from cigars. Secondly, and more crucially from a disciplinary perspective, 
workers could be differentiated by level of achievement so that success and failure become 
internalised into the subject. By measuring actual performance and then by comparing it 
against normalised, predetermined targets individuals could be quickly differentiated into 
those whose performance is normal (those meeting the targets) and those whose performance 
is abnormal. 
9 The interest of the management of the RTF in comparing, differentiating, 
hierarchaising and homogenising employees is reflected in the clothing protocol and 
the physical search procedures discussed earlier. 
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The availability of these measures makes it possible for management to hierarchaise 
relationships between organisational participants in written and formalised texts. Measures 
of performance and reports investigating reasons for deviations from targets are submitted 
by lower to higher managers. Managers can act on these reports; they may reward or 
penalise subordinates as they see fit, they may homogenise them by subjecting them to the 
same accounting metric, such as the use of piece rate and compensations, and they may 
ostracise and exclude those who fail to meet expectations. Thus, Mena was appointed 
Superintendent of the RTF by a Royal Decree, dated 26 September 1776, which stated to him 
".... you are allowed to move or expel any employee or worker in the RTF if you consider 
that necessary to maintaining the correct supply of tobacco". It is through such extremely 
powerful, yet apparently mundane, practices that accounting makes it possible for a 
combination of visible accountability and hierarchical organisation to subject individuals to 
surveillance and discipline. 
Yet, it is significant to recognise that those who are supposedly subjected to the disciplinary 
gaze of accounting engage in practices and scenarios that can redefine relationships with their 
superiors in the ongoing dynamics of power relations. The presence of surveillance and 
disciplining technologies such as accounting, does not guarantee full compliance. Thus, 
despite the installation of modes of physical checks and regular accounting reports on 
inventories and on production deliveries between successive production stages, those seeking 
to 'beat the system' were able to engineer scenarios through which it was possible to engage 
in 'deviant' behaviour. As indicated earlier, the archives demonstrate conclusively that 
tobacco theft in the RTF continued to go on, despite the installation of stricter visible and 
invisible monitoring procedures. As new and stricter monitoring arrangements are devised, 
new means of 'beating the system' are engineered, and the balance of power relations 
between higher and lower managers is therefore forever in a state of flux. As a concrete 
example, in 1765 the superintendent of the RTF noticed that despite the stringent control 
procedures in place, tobacco theft (by workers) continued to occur while raw tobacco was 
in transit from external warehouses to the factory premises. Consequently, on 23 August of 
the same year he issued a decree stipulating the use of two crews for tobacco transport; one 
to transport sealed tobacco to the factory and the other to transport it inside the factory. This 
procedure eliminated the loophole caused by the same operators moving in and out of the 
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factory. Whilst the discovery of the deviations documented in the archives can be hailed as 
a manifestation of the 'success' of the disciplinary regime, no doubt in addition to those less 
quantifiable cases where the instilled discipline inhibited further deviations, the potency of 
the system needs to be qualified on two accounts. Firstly, in the play off between what is 
rendered visible and what is left invisible, there may have been cases of deviations that went 
on undetected. Secondly, the fact that deviations, whether detected or undetected, continued 
to occur, strongly suggest that the sanctions associated with any disciplinary regime do not 
always attune to the personal impulses of every individual. 
But the disciplinary effects on higher level managers are not restricted to shifts in power 
relations mediated by lower level managers. Accounting as a disciplinary regime acts 
directly on higher level managers. Thus, managers such as Vallarin and Portocarrero were 
implicated in the game of disciplinary control, for while they are the main actors who 
oversaw the implementation of the control procedures to discipline and monitor others, their 
own performances were brought under the microscope of the very same regime. They each 
would have needed to demonstrate to others within and outside (e.g. the King and the 
Tobacco Agency) the RTF the normalcy of their practices. For example, the prosecution on 
account of tobacco theft and subsequent clearing of someone as senior as the Superintendent 
(the highest rank) of the RTF carries a double significance for the potency of disciplinary 
procedures. Firstly, his prosecution constructs a world in which the disciplinary gaze is 
depicted to reach every level in the hierarchy and every corner in the organisational space; 
the totality of surveillance is therefore reinforced with its potential disciplinary implications 
for all organisational members. Secondly, the significance of normalised practices is 
reinforced as the cleared Superintendent is reinstated as an innocent normal subject. These 
scenarios help discipline higher level managers because for them, just as much as for those 
below them, their practices are given compulsory visibility by the micro-technology of 
accounting and they are also subjected to the normalising effects of such a disciplinary 
procedure. 
- 34 -
-,--·------· 0 -'- _ 
SUM.l\1ARY, EXTENSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
In this final section of the paper we first summarise our main arguments briefly refer to some 
other cost accounting systems used by Spanish organisations that either preceded or were 
contemporary to the RTF and then draw out some implications. We have noted that while 
the control system in the RTF was mainly focused on monitoring employees, through 
practices such as visual supervision, the cost accounting system provided information which 
contributed to the minimisation of opportunities for theft and improvement of efficiency by 
making it possible to subject human behaviour to modes of surveillance. The cost accounting 
system combined calculations such as expected costs of direct labour and material 
consumption for those phases of the production process which were not susceptible to 
effective visual supervision. The system also provided calculations of various costs, e.g. 
production costs, and of value added which were incorporated into the cost of one of the 
items of raw materials. Nevertheless, this practice tended to single out the controllable 
elements of cost: indirect materials and wages. Production cost was a convenient financial 
indicator of the performance of the RTF, as the latter was treated as one major cost centre 
within the tobacco industry. Historical production costs were specifically used subsequently 
in experiments seeking to improve production and/or contain costs. Quality was emphasised 
in order to maintain the factory's competitive advantage in the face of clandestine tobacco 
production which was cheaper but of poorer quality. Ensuring high quality production was 
the means by which high tobacco prices were justified and sustained by the tobacco industry 
over the long term. Hence, substantive issues relating to quality were taken into account 
before deciding on alternative technological innovations in tobacco production. Similarly, 
quality was a basic priority in the management of tobacco production. 
The paper also provides some examples of the disciplinary effects that accounting practices 
can have on organisations. Operating as an invisible set of practices, accounting renders 
calculable and visible the activities, and hence the accountability, of individuals in the work 
place. This seemingly objective and uncontentious quantification of human effort and skill, 
through the development of measures such as the rate and mix of resource utilisation, create 
a new potential for those at the top of the hierarchy to engage in managerialist exercises on 
a much larger scale than ever before. With the aid of such measures, management can link 
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reward to performance in a most direct way; to both employer and employee reward 
becomes the outcome, indeed the celebration, of the visible delivery of human effort. 
Further, with these measures, management can compare, differentiate, hierarchaise, 
normalise and homogenise individuals. At an even more extreme level, management can 
isolate, exclude, and ultimately dismiss those individuals who defy the power of normalising 
practices. The disciplinary power of accounting reaches new heights in disciplining 
individuals. A Foucault (1977, p197) has pointed out: 
"Disciplinary power is exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it 
imposes on those it subjects a compulsory visibility. In discipline, it is the subjects 
who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is 
exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen that maintains the 
disciplined individual in his subjection". 
However, power relations between subordinates and superiors are frequently redefined and 
reshaped through dynamic interactions between both sides of the relation. Higher level 
managers are also subject to similar disciplinary effects both in terms of the disciplining of 
the self via the normalising practices of accounting and in terms of the surveillance of their 
activities by still higher constituencies that is made possible by the technology of accounting. 
Other Costin& Systems 
Our intention here is to provide a brief description of some cost accounting systems 
developed in other Spanish organisations that either preceded or were contemporaneous with 
the RTF. Our main objective in doing this is to show that the cost accounting system 
developed in the RTF was neither the first of its kind nor a unique system in Spain. Our 
own investigations, and those of other writers, lead us to suggest that the RTF episode does 
not represent a single isolated incidence of the use of cost accounting as a regime of 
calculation (see Carmona and Donoso, 1994). We suggest that there were parallel 
developments in Spain not only during the same period (the 18th century) but even much 
earlier. Thus, there is evidence of some primitive cost calculations undertaken in a coin 
factory (Royal Mint) in the kingdom of Aragon dating back to the 14th century (Perez, 
1990). Seemingly, the aim of these calculations was to determine the a priori cost of making 
a florin rather than to trace the actual cost of production. Later on this interest in cost 
calculation was to become much keener on producing more detailed calculations. Thus, the 
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archives of the Seville Mint show detailed cost calculations of each stage of the production 
process during the late 16th and early 17th centuries. Further, in a number of cases make 
or buy decisions were informed by these calculations. 
It is significant to note that during the 16th century accounting practices were carried out by 
managers who also had to perform their other managerial responsibilities. The importance 
of the roles of controllers, accountants, and internal auditors was widely recognised at that 
time and they were formally established later by state regulations in 1728. According to 
these regulations, the accountant had to keep several books covering various aspects of 
financial accounting. In addition, the accountant was required to keep records of the input 
of metals, the output of coins, wages, cost of materials, periodic metal inventories, and, as 
in the case of the RTF, to bring the inventory books up-to-date following the completion of 
every production cycle. Further, more refined accounting controls were also developed, as 
in the case of the Valladolid Mint, including the checking of metals received, accounting for 
waste during production, monitoring the movements of material within the factory, and 
matching coins produced against expected output. In a new set of regulations issued two 
years later, the position of the accountant in the Mint was upgraded, and was recognised as 
having a status higher than that of the treasurer. Further, the accountant was expected to 
have several important personal attributes: 
"He should have a high level of intelligence, be knowledgeable about accounting 
practices and bookkeeping, be capable of giving good opinions and behaving in a 
trustworthy manner, and be zealous and unselfish". 
(The 1730 Regulations) 
Additional evidence on the quest for calculability 18th century Spain comes from the Royal 
Textile Factory at Ezcaray which was founded in 1749 (Prieto Moreno, 1991). This factory 
was privately run prior to being taken over by the Crown in 1785 following a long period 
of mismanagement and a deteriorating financial position. Subsequently, a fairly refined cost 
accounting system was developed in the factory. The system provided separate cost 
calculations for raw materials, direct labour, and other elements of production costs. 
Further, administrative and selling costs were accumulated and apportioned between 
products. Forecasts of the annual volumes of production were generated and suitable mark-
ups were added to product costs before arriving at selling prices. 
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It is instructive to reflect further on the roles played by the cost accounting system in the 
Royal Textile Factory. Designed by the brother of one of the two founders of the Factory, 
Juan Garcia-Montenegro, who later became a joint owner following the death of his brother 
Manuel in 1765, the cost accounting system was systematically deployed not only to reflect 
the cost structure of textile production but also to generate signals that were deemed desirable 
by management to external parties. For example, in 1773 the company was converted into 
a limited liability company in order to raise more funds for the purposes of improving its 
growth potential. But demand for the share issue was below expectations and the company 
failed to raise the whole amount of new capital needed for expansion. During the period 
which immediately followed the unsuccessful share issue, cost calculations were produced 
with the purpose of demonstrating the economic viability of the factory to potential investors. 
Specifically, through the provision of these calculations the management of the Textile 
Factory constructed arguments with the aim of enticing the King to make a substantial 
investment (300,000 Reales) in the factory. More relevant from a performance monitoring 
perspective was that these calculations were used by management to demonstrate to the 
factory workers that they were wasteful in performing their tasks. 
The manner in which these cost accounting systems were designed and put to use brings out 
conclusions parallel to those derived from the RTF case. The common themes shared among 
all these systems (including that of the RTF) are manifold. Firstly, there was clear emphasis 
on the financial quantification of the economic performance of production stages for the 
purposes of cost accumulation and on determining the cost of a product and for the purposes 
of pricing decisions as in the case of the Textile Factory at Ezcaray. Secondly, and 
relatedIy, there was strong emphasis on the use of the cost accounting system as a means of 
monitoring employee performance, as evident from the use of a priori cost calculations and 
the comparison of actual against expected output and accounting for waste in production in 
the Valladolid Mint, and the use of cost performance to reveal the wastefulness of employees 
as in the case of the Textile Factory at Ezcaray. Thirdly, the cost accounting systems were 
designed by employees of high rank and significance within each organisation and whose 
carecrs and financial rewards improved even more with the rise of the status of the cost 
accounting function in the organisation. 
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Implications 
Some researchers have been concerned to link the emergence and functioning of cost 
accounting systems to the dictates of competitive pressure (e.g. Pollard, 1965; Edwards and 
Newell, 1991; Fleischman and Parker, 1991) or to the need to provide 'synthetic' prices in 
the absence of markets (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987). These arguments are part of a demand-
response research tradition; the emergence of cost accounting is seen as a response to the 
demands imposed by competitive pressure or absence of markets. In the absence of such 
demand there is little need, it would seem, for a response. 
There is, however, a growing recognition of the need to examine the rise of cost accounting 
in other, less competitive settings (e.g. Fleischman and Parker, 1991). At the very least, 
such shift in emphasis signals a move away from privileging economic competition or the 
absence of markets as the driving force behind the rise of cost accounting if not necessarily 
questioning the demand-response mode of explanation. One of the contributions of this paper 
could be seen in terms of yielding support to this newer emphasis; in this case the 
emergence of cost accounting in the RTF can be linked to situations of state monopoly. This 
could also be seen as consistent with recent research which has contextualised the rise of 
accounting practices in ancient civilisations, whether those with an explicit profit motive, 
albeit with no evidence of competitive pressure, such as Mesopotamia (Niessen, Damerow 
and Englund, 1993) or those with state-owned institutions, where the very notion of profit 
is alien, such as ancient Egypt (Ezzamel, 1993a; 1993b; Ezzamel and Hoskin, 1994). Such 
contributions can be seen to undermine the obsession with looking for competitive forces to 
provide the sole, or most compelling, explanation for the emergence of cost accounting. 
However, in our view the most significant implications of this paper relate to the 
consequences emanating from the intervention of accounting in organisations. Once available 
as a micro-technology, accounting opens up new possibilities through which work practices 
and power relations can be renegotiated and redefined. Accounting endows organisational 
activities with distinct visibility through its ability to operate as a calculative regime. By 
subjecting the detailed activities of the RTF to its calculative metric, human performance 
became more visible and once visible, it was rendered more amenable to systematic 
surveillance, monitoring and discipline. The intervention of accounting can also be seen to 
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promote new areas of discourse and to constitute areas of economic action (Hopwood, 1990; 
Ezzamel, 1994). The experiments conducted in the RTF (production and make/buy) were 
promoted, through accounting calculation, into alternative discourses of production and were 
constituted into areas of economic action as they were adopted in future RTF activities 
displacing less economically efficient alternatives. As accounting intervenes into 
organisational activities and domains, power relations are reconstituted. Accounting is 
therefore never the technically simple, mundane and neutral technology that it has come to 
be known. 
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FIGURE 1 
The 1778 Production Experiment 
This statement shows that it is possible to mill and produce in 292 working days/year more 
than six million pounds of tobacco. This procedure was designed by Mr Francisco 
Portocarrero, General Inspector of these factories. The experiment took place over the 
period 21 April - 25 May. 
Detail of 638,717 pounds of tobacco produced in the aforementioned 30 days as well as of 
those which might be produced in 292 days. 
It was certified by Mr Juan Josef Corres, Fiel (Supervisor) of the Mills, that in the 
aforementioned 30 days 175,875 pounds of tobacco leaves were milled in Monte. Three 
capataces (foremen) certified that this is the finest work in progress produced ever in the 
Factory. 
Corres also certified that 462,842 pounds were remilled over those 30 days in Monte. The 
aforementioned capataces (Manuel de Molina, Gaspar Moreno and Francisco Sanchez) 
certified the perfectness of this tobacco. 
According to the data shows above, 638,717 pounds of tobacco were milJed in the Monte 
mills without diminishing the quality. Due to this, it should be possible to produce 
6,216,845 pounds in 292 days. 
Detail of 600,000 pounds of tobacco worked. This tobacco produced 672,412 1/2 pounds of 
exquisite and fine tobacco of the following classes: 
Pedro Alonso Guines Madrid Mixto Fino Others 
114,409 112,274 21,465 180,022 244,477 765 
TOTAL pounds worked to perfection: 672,412 
If 672,412 pounds were worked to perfection in 30 days, 6,544,815 could be worked in 292 
days/year. 
According to the certifications of the supervisor and foremen of Monte and Repaso, and 
those of Moja, Warehouse of Fermentation and those of the inspectors who checked daily 
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FIGURE 1 continued 
the experiment. All the file is stored in the Accounting (Contadurla) Department. Seville 
May, 30 1778. Manuel Vallarin 
This would have been the cost of producing 
tobacco through the old procedure . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6,176,470 ..... 20 
Actual cost through the new procedure 1,852,941 6 
Positive variation for the RTF 4,323,529 14 
I will add the value of 2,255,996 1/2 which were considered as waste and put them through. 
Nevertheless, Francisco Portocarrero stated that these materials could be processed through 
the new procedure. Its value is 67,945,306 12 
Overall benefits 72,268,835 36 
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